This paper modifies the two-industry, two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model with intermediate goods to decompose trade into its horizontal and vertical intra-industry, as well as inter-industry parts. Acknowledging that liberalization affects each type of trade differently, and that changes in each imply labor adjustment of different magnitudes, the paper analyzes the effects of widely observed asymmetries in liberalization policies. The paper concludes with the implications of the model for the liberalization between the East and the West through the Europe Agreements.
country. This will result in horizontal intra-industry trade. Furthermore, an intermediate product is added to each industry, and joint production is allowed. In this framework, production process can be internationally fragmented: Producers now have the option of buying the intermediate from the partner, and sell back the finished product, if prices among other things allow. This will lead to vertical intra-industry trade. Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) , Krugman (1996) , Leamer (1996) and Antweiler and Trefler (1997) refer to the importance of this international disintegration of production during liberalization. Finally, the usual factor endowment differences between partners will cause inter-industry trade.
Decomposing trade into its parts is important since liberalization affects each type of trade differently, and changes in each imply labor adjustment and welfare gains of different magnitudes. Especially, decomposing intra-industry into its vertical and horizontal parts is critical in terms of its implications for adjustment in labor. An adjustment occurs since the factors used in the production of a good are specific, and cannot be used in the production of other goods without transformation. In horizontal IIT, similar varieties are exchanged, whereas vertical IIT is the exchange of different products in the same industry due to vertical disintegration of production process. In other words, in vertical IIT, the production of commodities traded requires a different set of skills. Reallocating labor into jobs requiring different skills is costly, even if the jobs in question are in the same industry. Therefore, vertical-IIT changes involve some labor adjustment, and thus they are costly, but probably less costly than inter-industry-type changes. Analyzing only the inter-industry trade would underestimate the magnitude of adjustment in labor markets and the implied adjustment costs.
In Section 2, I present the model. The labor adjustment implications and the associated welfare gains of different liberalization policies are examined in Section 3, as well as the effects of differences in size, and in factor abundance. The paper concludes with the implications of the model to the European Union's integration with Central and Eastern European countries.
The model
There are two factors of production: high-and low-skill labor, L h and L l . They are used in producing four goods in two industries: goods x 1 and y 1 in industry 1, and goods x 2 and y 2 in industry 2. An industry is defined as a group of goods with input-output relations. In this model, each good y is an intermediate good used in the production of good x in the same industry.
Intermediate goods can be consumed directly as well. The production functions have constant returns to scale, represented by the following unit-input requirements:
where L fgi is the amount of factor f used in the production of good g in industry i. Q gi is the amount of good g production in industry i. a yxi is the per unit requirement of the intermediate good y in the production of the final good x in industry i. w h and w l are wages of high-and lowskill labor, respectively.
Production technologies respond to changes in wages in the following way: 
where s represents the degree of similarity in factor abundance between the two countries. By assumption, A is relatively high-skill abundant. v represents the size of country A relative to B.
Total population in B is assumed to be 1. Thus, Firms are profit-maximizers. In particular, in country A, the profit-maximizing prices of goods in industry i is as follows: (7 Representative consumers in each country have identical nested Cobb-Douglas/CES preferences. In particular, for consumers in country A, the utility at tariff rate t is as follows:
is consumption of good g in industry i produced in A.
A(B) gi
C is country A's consumption of the variety produced in B.
Note first that the above utility function implies that the share of expenditures on industry i is β i , whereas α is the share of expenditures on domestic and imported varieties of good x in the budget allocated to an industry. Note further that consumers consider both countries' products as imperfect substitutes: Consumers, unlike producers, are conscious of the country of origin of the products they consume, and they treat imports as differentiated varieties as in Armington (1969) . (11) 1 and otherwise 0
Income in each country is: Using the following goods-market-equilibrium conditions, the model now can be solved: Labor is mobile across industries and firms within an industry. As they move due to liberalization, their relocation is costly due to moving costs, training costs, and other costs known as adjustment costs. In this paper, aggregate amount of labor relocations within an industry or across industries is used to proxy the adjustment costs.
IIT-hIIT vIIT
3 Size of labor adjustment relative to total labor force associated with a decrease in the tariff rates from t 1 to t 2 is measured as follows:
where ∆L fgi is the decrease in the amount of factor f employed in the production of good g in industry i resulting from the decrease in tariff rates. When labor is relocated, a decrease in the employment of a firm implies an increase in the employment of another. This is the reason why the summation is carried out only over the goods (firms) where there are decreases in employment. This is done separately for each type of labor. Cline et al. (1978) , Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson (1980) However, they take into account only inter-industry factor allocations, and ignore the adjustment costs of intra-industry labor movements resulting from vertical IIT changes. The results reported assume the parameters printed in bold. 5 Slaughter (1997) analyzes the effects of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticity and finds mixed results for whether trade liberalization increases elasticity. His empirical analysis finds the elasticity to be around -0.6 and -1.3 for the manufacturing sector. Therefore, presented results will assume that the elasticity does not change during liberalization and is equal to -1. L is 0.2 such that 20% of the population in country A has low skills. This implies that the relative factor abundance in A, k A , is 4. Degree of similarity, s, is initially 2.5, implying that the relative factor abundance in B is 1.5; that is, 40% of the population in country B has low skills. The relative size of country A, v, is 1, which implies the same size for the population of both countries. Non-resource-consuming trade barriers are initially assumed to be zero.
Results of the model
Liberalization policies are analyzed as tariff rates are lowered from 50% down to 0%, in decrements of one percentage point. In each step, first, certain wage rates are assumed for highand low-skill labor in both countries. Using these wage rates, first the unit factor requirements, and then the prices of goods in every industry for both countries are computed. Next, with the help of Equation (11), I find out whether any country will be importing an intermediate product for production purposes. Later, I check if the goods-market-equilibrium conditions are met.
Different wage rates are tried until the wage rates that satisfy the equilibrium conditions by an insignificant amount of excess, which is set at 0.1%, are found. 8 Finally, shares of different types of trade, adjustment of labor, and welfare gains are computed. Figure 1 shows the effects of a symmetric liberalization: Both countries are initially levying the same tariff rates on all imports; and these tariffs are lowered at the same rate. At high tariffs, there is only inter-industry and horizontal intra-industry trade. As liberalization lowers the tariffs for the imports, the share of horizontal IIT starts increasing smoothly. This is a direct result of Equation (9): Both countries, imports become relatively cheaper; and they start importing and exporting different varieties of the same product more. Later, an increase in the share of interindustry trade occurs as countries specialize in the industry that intensively uses their relatively abundant factor. This specialization does not become significant until tariff rates are low enough.
a. Symmetric liberalization
To observe inter-industry trade between countries C and C' in good g in industry i, tariff rates should be low enough to satisfy the following, where C is the importer of the good:
When the rates are further lowered, vertical IIT appears. As implied by Equation (11) 
∆
shows the share of aggregate labor relocations in both countries to total labor force in both, as tariff rates are lowered from 50% to a particular rate t. increase in its welfare, whereas B experiences more than 21% increase. Interestingly, low-skill country experiences higher adjustment costs, but this is associated with larger gains in welfare. Figure 2 shows the effects of having sensitive industries in a liberalization policy. In this case, each country liberalizes only the industry in which it has comparative advantage.
b. Industry-asymmetric liberalization
Consequently, high-skill abundant country A has comparative advantage in industry 1, and B has an advantage in industry 2. The tariff rates in these industries are assumed to be the same in both countries, and are lowered at the same rate, while sensitive sectors of each country are kept protected at tariff rates of 50%.
There are three main differences between this and the symmetric case: First, no vertical IIT is observed, not even at low tariff rates. Obviously, keeping the sectors that the partner country has advantage out of liberalization does not allow for intra-industry specialization through vertical IIT. Second, the adjustment of labor is higher than that in symmetric liberalization, about 78% versus 29% of total labor force. In particular, labor relocations amount to 84% of the labor force in country A, and 66% of the labor force in B. Higher labor adjustments can be explained by the fact that at low tariff rates the increase is just inter-industry, rather than a combination of interindustry and vertical IIT as in the symmetric case. This observation provide further evidence that even if vertical IIT changes causes some labor relocations, they are not as high as the one caused by inter-industry trade changes. Lastly, welfare gains are smaller, namely about 12% increase.
Lower gain is quite intuitive since this liberalization does not allow much room for fully exploiting partner's advantage through specialization. High-skill country A does not experience a significant increase in its welfare, whereas B experiences an increase by about 19%. It is interesting to see that, even if low-skill country B has lower adjustment than A, B is the country that collects most of the benefits of integration.
c. Country-asymmetric liberalization
This case is intended to illustrate what happens when one partner liberalizes its trade faster than the other. In practice, the more developed partner typically liberalizes faster. In the model, country A's population is relatively more skilled, i.e. more developed by assumption. Therefore, it is assumed that A lowers its tariff barriers at the same rate for all industries and goods. B's tariff rates are kept at 50%. Figure 3 shows the effects of this country asymmetry.
As tariff rates are lowered, an increase in the share of horizontal IIT is experienced due to lower relative prices of imported varieties. However, in this case, neither a sharp increase in the share of inter-industry trade at low tariff rates, nor any vertical IIT is observed. Apparently, with only one country liberalizing its trade, there is not much room for inter-industry or intra-industry specialization. Since the changes in inter-industry trade are small, there are small labor adjustments, only about 4% of total labor force. The adjustment in country A amounts to around 5% of its labor force, whereas they are about 4% in B. This result is also intuitive: The country that liberalizes its market bears more adjustment. Without much specialization, the welfare gains are small, about 11%, compared to 14% in symmetric liberalization. In particular, country A's welfare gains are at around 4%, versus 16% for country B. Once again, the gains in low-skill country B are higher. Obviously, the more advanced country does not have much to gain from liberalization with a low-skill abundant country.
d. Effect of similarity of countries' factor abundance
The effects of similarity are explored in Figure 4 . Different factor abundance degrees, s = k Ak B = 1, and 3 are analyzed, while the portion of low-skill labor in country A is kept at 20%. Then, the corresponding part of B's population with low skill is 25%, and 50%, respectively. The former case is used to analyze the effects of liberalization between two fairly similar countries, and the latter for those of significantly different ones. Tariff rates for all goods in both countries are lowered at the same rate as in the case of symmetric liberalization.
In both cases, the same trend throughout the liberalization is observed: First, the share of horizontal IIT increases, then that of the inter-industry trade, and at very low tariff rates, vertical IIT emerges. In the first case, however, countries are very similar, and therefore not much interindustry trade develops. An increase in its share is observed only at very low tariff rates.
Consistent with this observation, labor adjustment is somewhat smaller. In country A, it amounts to about 35% of labor force, whereas it is around 22% in B. Furthermore, since there is not much room to exploit each other's comparative advantage due to high similarity, welfare gains are also relatively low. In particular, country A gains 6%, versus 19% gain in B. In the second case, countries are very different from each other; more inter-industry specialization, and vertical intraindustry specialization is observed. There are higher welfare gains, through inter-and vertical intra-industry specialization. Country A gains about 13% increase in its welfare, whereas B gains around 24%. One more time, low-skill country gains more. There is a lot of labor relocation when countries are different in terms of factor abundance. In particular, country A experiences adjustments of labor amounting to about 67% of its labor force, and in B around 106%.
e. Effect of relative population size
The analysis so far assumes that the two countries have the same population size. In this However, when country A is twice as populated as B, the welfare gains in A fall down to 4%, the gains for B increase to 43%. The model suggests that small countries benefit more from trade liberalization. When country A is the smaller of the two, adjustment of labor are about 67% of its labor force, and that in country B is about 53% of its labor force. However, when country A is twice as populated as B, the labor adjustments in A fall down to 28% of its labor force, the adjustments for B fall to 48% of labor force. Intuitively, when the bigger country is skill abundant, liberalization does not result in much labor relocations. Furthermore, more labor adjustments are born by the low-skill country, but it also captures higher welfare gains. When the low-skill country is bigger adjustment for both are higher, but so are the welfare gains.
f. Non-resource consuming trade barriers
These trade barriers work as ad-valorem tariffs that do not go down to zero like a floor on liberalization. That is, even if the tariff rates are zero, these barriers might prevent the changes observed at low tariff rates. For example, in the case of symmetric liberalization, the increase in inter-industry trade or the vertical IIT at low tariff rates may not be observed. This partly explains why the share of vertical IIT is higher for neighboring countries, which presumably experience lower trade barriers. Furthermore, previous analysis showed that most of the adjustment of labor and welfare gains occurs at low tariff rates. If the size of these trade barriers is large enough, there may not be much welfare gains associated with integration, neither will there be much structural adjustment.
When robustness of the results is checked, the general patterns of changes are preserved.
However, using different constants slightly alters the magnitude and timing these changes. Consequently, the welfare gains in the EU are estimated to be small. Higher welfare gains, however, implies higher costs for CEEC.
Other empirical analyses on CEEC-EU trade find some increase in inter-industry trade with substantial increase horizontal IIT, but no significant increase in vertical IIT. This observation is 9 The results of the robustness analysis, and the associated graphs are available from the author upon request. 10 The EA opened the EU market of about 350 million people compared to total of 100 million people in the CEEC. In terms of relative factor abundance, CEEC could be as skill intensive as the EU, considering the importance given to education for many years under central planning.
supported by the findings of Daviddi (1992) , Cadot and de Melo (1995) , and de Melo and Tarr (1988) . These results are in accordance with the model's outcome. Figure 4 . Similarity in factor abundance All tariff rates are lowered at the same rate in both countries. 
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